Coherent Multidimensional Poverty Measurement*

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Abstract

This paper presents a family of multidimensional poverty indexes that measure poverty as a function of the extent and the intensity of poverty. We provide a unique axiomatics from which both extent and intensity of poverty can be derived, as well as the poor endogenously identified. This axiomatics gives rise to a family of multidimensional indexes whose extremal points are the geometric mean and the Maximin solution. We show that, in addition to all the standard features studied in the literature, these indexes are continuous (a must for cardinal poverty measures) and ordinal, in the sense that they do not depend upon the units in which dimensions of achievements (or deprivations) are computed. Moreover, they verify the decreasing marginal rate of substitution property: the higher one’s deprivation in one dimension, the smaller the increase of achievement in that dimension that suffices to compensate for a decrease of achievement in another dimension.

Keywords: multidimensional poverty, geometric mean, Maximin solution, utilitarian solution, endogenous identification, coherence, continuity, decreasing marginal rate of substitution, cardinal data, ordinality, relative weights

JEL Classification Numbers: I3, I32, D31, D63, O1

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1 Introduction

As acknowledged by Villar et al. (2010), “defining a poverty measure in a truly multidimensional context involves a number of subtle and difficult issues: choosing the appropriate poverty dimensions beyond income or wealth, deciding on whether they all are equally important, fixing sensible thresholds in those dimensions and setting criteria to identify as poor those individuals whose achievements lie partially below them, defining an overall measure of poverty intensity, etc. Those difficulties anticipate that many compromises are required and, indirectly, that the axiomatic approach may be the best way to deal with this type of problem as it makes explicit all those compromises.”

Here, we provide an axiomatization for a family of Multidimensional Poverty Indices. This is part of a larger research program devoted to a Relational Capability Index applied as a new poverty measure in Nigeria, Indonesia and India.

Each index can be characterized as lying somewhere between the two extremal points of our family of indices: the geometric mean (Villar et al. (2010)) and the Rawlsian Maximin (Rawls (1971)). Although both social choice correspondences have been thoroughly studied from the social choice theoretical viewpoint, we are not aware of any attempt to link these two major concepts of justice with the concerns involved in the literature devoted to poverty measurement. This paper is a first attempt to fill this gap.

We suggest that the geometric mean can be interpreted as being a (hyperbolic) version of the “utilitarian” viewpoint. With this interpretation in mind, our family of indices builds a bridge between celebrated theories of justice and poverty measurements. An alternative standpoint enables us to characterize each one of our indices as being the supremum of the weighted geometric averages, the sup being taken over some collection of weights over dimensions and people. When the collection of weights reduces to the uniform vector, we are back to the standard geometric mean (this is the “utilitarian” solution). When the underlying collection of weights includes the whole unit simplex over dimensions and people, then we get the Maximin solution. One possible interpretation is as follows: suppose that the economist who is in charge of measuring poverty in a given population reflects as if she were in Rawls’ original position. Beyond the

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2 HDCA WP.

3 See Dhillon and Mertens (1999) and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) to name but a few path-breaking papers in this area.
veil of ignorance, the point that is ignored is not which role one will endorse (as in the
standard, political interpretation of Rawls’ theory of justice) but in which dimension
one will get some talent (or some endowment, or some “social capital”). So uncer-
tainty bears on dimensions rather than on persons. In addition, from the viewpoint
of the analyst in the “original position”, there might be some ambiguity concerning
the probability according to which achievements and deprivations will be distributed.
As a result, if the economist has no prejudice about the distribution of achievements
and deprivations, she might opt for the Maximin solution as a way to measure mul-
tidimensional poverty. If, on the contrary, she has good reasons to believe that the
distribution will be uniform, she may want to choose the “utilitarian” solution (i.e., in
our context, the geometric average). Else, she might choose an index in our family
which lies somewhere between the first two. If one wishes so, it is also possible to
include ambiguity about the persons (and not only dimensions) in the non-symmetric
version of our family of indices.

To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to formally fill the gap between
theories of justice and poverty measurements. As we take inspiration from Artzner
et al. (1999) (where an additive version of a similar axiomatization was introduced in
order to measure the risk position of a portfolio), we call coherent a multidimensional
poverty index belonging to our family. We finally show that such indices satisfy the
following properties that are considered as desirable in the literature:

(i) Each index is continuous: slight changes in the achievements of certain persons only
induce slight changes in the poverty measurement;

(ii) Each index is ordinal, in the sense that it does not depend upon the choice of
the specific units in which dimensions of achievements are measured. This property
deserves some comment. In Alkire and Foster (2011a) it is argued that data describing
capabilities and functionings in the spirit of Sen’s Multidimensional Human Index, are
ordinal in nature. They therefore may lack a basis for comparisons across dimensions.
This, of course, is a challenge for Multidimensional Poverty measurement. In the above
quoted paper, indeed, only one kind of measures is shown to be ordinal in that sense
(the $M^0$ measure in their parlance) while the others don’t. At the same time, this
ordinal measure fails to satisfy a number of other properties. In particular, it cannot
capture the intensity of poverty —a failure that can be viewed as arising from its being
a piecewise constant (hence discontinuous) measure. Here, we prove that coherent
Poverty measures are ordinal in the following sense: If one multiplies any dimension
by $\lambda > 0$ (both for achievements and for the poverty cut-off), then the set of poor
is unaffected while the Index, $P$, is simply multiplied by $\lambda$. As a consequence, a


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4See, e.g., Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003) and Alkire and Foster (2011a).
normalized version of the index, $Q$, is independent of such changes in the dimensions’ unit.

(iii) it yields a criterion for “relative poverty” that depends upon the whole population under scrutiny;

(iv) the marginal rate of substitution among subjects or among dimensions is decreasing. The reduction in the deprivation of dimension $k$ for poor individual $i$ required to compensate an increase in the deprivation of dimension $k$ for individual $h$ is larger the higher the initial level of deprivation in $i$.

(v) As in Villar et al. (2010), it is multiplicatively decomposable by population subgroups (but it does not satisfy Subgroup Decomposability in the additive form given in Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003)). This property says the following: if the population is partitioned into subgroups, the overall poverty index corresponds to the weighted average of subgroup poverty values, where the weights correspond to population shares.

(vi) In certain circumstances, we may have additional information that allows us to regard certain dimensions and/or certain subgroups of the population as meriting a greater relative weight than others. Each index can be adjusted so as to capture this kind of requirements. Of course, if one wishes so, it can as well be made symmetric among persons.

(vii) It verifies the transfer principle (Villar et al. (2010)): a reduction of size $\delta > 0$ in the deprivation with respect to dimension $k$ of a poor person $i$ who is worse off in this dimension than another poor person, $j$, more than compensates an increase of the same size, $\delta$, in the deprivation of $j$, provided their relative positions remain unaltered.

(viii) Principle of population: a replica of the population does not change the poverty measure.

To the best of our knowledge, coherent poverty measures are the first examples of continuous and ordinal Multidimensional Poverty measure that are sensitive to inequality. To take but alternative examples, the measure $M^0$ introduced in Alkire and Foster (2011a) is ordinal but discontinuous and inequality-insensitive. On the other hand, the measures $M^1$ and $M^2$ are inequality-sensitive and continuous but no more ordinal.

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5Recall that a person is said to be deprived in one dimension whenever her achievement falls below the cut-off or dimension-specific poverty line.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the model and points out the link between the "utilitarian" standpoint and the geometric mean. Section 3 deals with the axiomatization of coherent multidimensional poverty indices. The last section provides the main properties of this family of indices.

2 Should we aggregate into multidimensional indices?

Consider now the Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) developed by Alkire and Santos (2010) for the 2010 Human Development Report (UNDP 2010). They choose 10 variables for their MPI under the same three headings - health, education and living standards - as the UNDP's Human Development Index (HDI). There are two variables for health (malnutrition, and child mortality), two for education (years of schooling and school enrollment), and six for deprivation in "living standards" (namely cooking with wood, charcoal or dung; not having a conventional toilet; lack of easy access to safe drinking water; no electricity; dirt, sand or dung flooring and not owning at least one of a radio, TV, telephone, bike or car). Poverty is measured separately in each of these 10 dimensions. The equally-weighted aggregate poverty measures for each of these three main headings are then weighted equally (one-third each) to form the composite index, also echoing the HDI. A household is identified as being poor if it is deprived across at least 30% of the weighted indicators. While the HDI uses aggregate country-level data, the Alkire and Santos (2010) MPI uses household-level data, which are then aggregated to the country level. Alkire and Santos (2010) construct their index for more than 100 countries.

Alkire and Santos (2010b, p.7) argue that their index goes beyond previous international measures of poverty to identify the poorest people and aspects in which they are deprived. Such information is vital to allocate resources where they are likely to be most effective.

Consider the following stylized example of a policy problem. Suppose that there are two dimensions of welfare, "income" and "access to services". Assume that an "income-poor" but "services-rich" household attaches a high value to extra income but a low value to extra services, while the opposite holds for an "income-rich" but "services-poor" household. There are two policy instruments, a transfer payment and service provision. The economy is divided into geographic areas (which could be countries) and a given area gets either the service or the transfer. We then calculate a composite index like the Alkire and Santos (2010) MPI based on survey data on incomes and access to services. There is bound to be a positive correlation between average income and
service provision, but (nonetheless) some places have high income poverty but adequate services, while others have low income poverty but poor services. The policymaker then decides whether each area gets the transfer or the service. Plainly, the policymaker should not be using the aggregate MPI for this purpose, for then some income-poor but service-rich households will get even better services, while some income-rich but service-poor households will get the transfer. The total impact on (multidimensional) poverty would be lower if one based the allocation on the MPI rather than the separate poverty measures - one for incomes and one for access to services. It is not the aggregate index that we need for this purpose but its components.

In certain emergency situations (such as on the battle field), treatment decisions often require prioritizing patients ("triage") and it appears that this is typically based on the probability of survival, which is a single index. But then one is not creating a "mashup index" since the variables and weights are entirely determined by their ability to predict that probability. There is nothing analogous to this probability in a MPI.

2.1 What are market prices good for?

Ravallion (2011): “One can distinguish two approaches to forming an aggregate poverty index. The first is to use prices (actual or imputed) to form a composite index for aggregate consumption, to be compared to a poverty line defined in the same space. Ideally this is not just consumption of market goods and services, but should include imputed values for non-market commodities. For market goods, either their market prices or appropriate shadow prices can be used. For non-market goods the missing "prices" will need to be assigned on a priori grounds or estimated. In practice, most poverty measures require imputations for missing prices, so this approach is a natural extension of prevailing practices. In principle we can broaden this approach to allow for non-commodity dimensions of welfare. The space defined by all primary dimensions of welfare (including commodities) can be called the "attainment space" (though the term "achievements" is also used in the literature), and the aggregation can be called "attainment aggregation". The weights on attainments can be called "prices", understood to include imputed prices."

The second approach measures poverty in each of the dimensions separately and then aggregates the dimension-specific "deprivations" into a composite index. Formal treatments of this approach can be found in Tsui (2002), Bourguignon and Chakravarty (2003), Duclos et al. (2006) and Alkire and Foster (2011b). The Alkire and Santos (2010) MPI is an example. We shall call this "deprivation aggregation."
"taking the attainment-aggregation approach, the remaining challenges are all in applications, notably in estimating missing prices."

The main argument in favor of the attainment-aggregation approach seems to be the following:

"For the attainment-aggregation approach, it is plain that the poverty measure's MRS - the increment to $z_1$ needed to compensate for less of $z_2$ keeping the poverty measure constant - is simply the relative price, $p_1/p_2$. As long as the poverty bundle is consistent with the choices made by someone living at the poverty line, the poverty orderings based on this approach will be consistent with consumer welfare, in the sense that if someone living at the poverty line becomes worse (better) off then measured poverty rises (falls). Under these conditions, the poverty line is the point on the consumer's expenditure function (inverse of the indirect utility function) corresponding to the poverty level of utility. Then any exogenous welfare-reducing (increasing) change - such as due to a change in relative prices, or any other shift parameter of the individual utility function - will be poverty increasing (decreasing) for all standard poverty measures. Thus welfare consistency is assured with appropriate calibration." (p. 12).

"The upshot of these observations is that aggregation across deprivations cannot in general yield poverty measures that are consistent with the welfare of someone living at the poverty line. This is because deprivation aggregation essentially ignores all implications for welfare measurement of consumer choice in a market economy. While those implications need not be decisive in welfare measurement, it is clearly worrying if the implicit trade-off between any two market goods built into a poverty measure differs markedly from the trade-off facing someone at the poverty line. When calibrated correctly, an attainment-aggregation measure guarantees that poor people would accept the trade-offs built into the poverty measure." (p. 13).

In other words, the strength of the attainment-aggregation procedure (which, in the framework of the present paper, amounts to restricting poverty indices to the utilitarian one, weighted by market prices) would be that it allegedly enables to identify welfare-improving changes with poverty-reducing reforms. Which, in turn, guarantees that the poor themselves and the policymakers must agree on such changes/reforms. Of course, such a viewpoint faces a major empirical challenge, which consists in computing reasonable "shadow prices" for those services or social goods that are not marketed.
Obviously, the author is perfectly aware of this difficulty. Let us nonetheless stress its depth. OECD’s arm’s length principle.

But there is a much deeper problem faced by this argument in favor of the attainment-aggregation procedure — a difficulty that would appear even if all achievements of interest were tradable in perfectly competitive markets. Are we so sure, indeed, that any exogenous change that reduces poverty (as measured by ??) indeed increases the welfare of each household (as measured by some implicit utility function whose MRS are given by p)?

Here are a number of objections:

1) First, changes must be infinitesimal for the argument to hold water. Any change outside the budget set of non-negligible size might end up at a point that makes the household worse off rather than better off in terms of welfare. Thus, to be convincing, the argument should describe what it concretely means, in terms of public policy, to put into practice infinitesimal increments of some attainments.

2) Second, the MRS are equal to the price ratios only for barter economies. As soon as money is introduced, there is a wedge induced by the short-term interest rate.

The upshot is that, in order to be able to infer any relationship between the slope of the poverty line and the MRS of the household, one needs to take into account the conditions prevailing on the credit market to which the household has access. Given the widespread use of microcredit nowadays, it would be hardly convincing to pretend that poor households are not affected, in some way or another, by the credit conditions.

3) Suppose, now, that we know what infinitesimal changes mean, and that we can dream up a barter economy where some policymakers would aim at fighting against poverty. Even then, the argument sketched above would not work, as a household is not a single person, in general. How do we know that it behaves on markets in the same way as would a single individual? In fact, not only do we not have any evidence for that, but neoclassical micro-economics even teaches us that there is no hope, in general, for a household to behave in the same way as an individual does — unless the household were just made of a single person. This is the celebrated Sonnenschein-Mantel-Debreu theorem, which tells that the aggregate excess demand function of an economy with L marketed commodities can be any continuous and inward-pointing vector field on the (positive part of the) unit sphere of normalized prices, provided it is populated by at least L consumers. This implies that, even when observed prices \((p_1, p_2)\) were supposed to be equilibrium prices that clear the market for attainments 1 and 2, these prices
could hardly be interpreted as being the MRS of any household made up with at least 2 persons.

4) The complications do not stop there. As pointed out by Keen (p. 50), taking seriously the micro-economic theory of supply curves implies that the budget “line” faced by any consumer, in fact, must be a curve. When a household purchases a first unit of some attainment, it pays some given price, $p_1$. But if its demand for that attainment increases, then, due to decreasing marginal productivity, the price will rise up. As stated by Keen, “the budget curve might start at the same point as the line did (with an isolated consumer) when consumption is zero, but it must slope more steeply than the line as the consumer’s consumption rises above zero” (p 52). Of course, if returns to scale of the production sector are not decreasing but rather increasing, the problem does not disappear: the budget “line” is still a curve but, now, in addition, the budget set is no more convex. Since, in general, we have good reasons to believe that manufactured commodities exhibit increasing returns to scale, this means that, in general, the poverty line should be a hyperbola as shown in Figure. 1. This is exactly the situation of which the next section will provide the theoretical grounds.

3 The model

Let $N = \{1, ..., N\}$ denote a society consisting of $N$ individuals and let $K = \{1, ..., K\}$ be a set of dimensions.

A social state is a matrix, $y_{ij} \in M_{N \times K}(\mathbb{R}^{++})$, with $N$ rows, one for each individual, and $K$ columns, one for each dimension. The entry $y_{ij} \in \mathbb{R}^{++}$ describes the value of variable $j$ for individual $i$. Since we are mostly going to deal with ordinal Poverty measures, there is little loss of generality in imposing from the outset that all variables be strictly positive.

A vector $z \in \mathbb{R}^K$ of reference values describes the poverty thresholds for all dimensions. How these thresholds are fixed is definitely an important issue, but we leave it aside here and take $z$ as given. Those reference values may have been fixed externally (absolute poverty lines) or may depend on the data of the social state matrix itself (relative

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\footnote{Of course, we cannot claim that this entails no loss of generality. If some achievement is “naturally” given as being (strictly) positive, then, whether it is scored $\varepsilon > 0$ or $\lambda \varepsilon > 0$ does not matter. However, if the original achievement was 0, then, replacing it by $\varepsilon > 0$ might have an effect on the poverty measure. The same problem arises, e.g., in Seth (2003). Provided the restriction of achievements to strictly positive numbers is accepted, coherent poverty indices can be applied to cardinal measures.}
poverty lines, such as a fraction of the median or the mean value). The units in which achievements are measured are chosen so that \( z \gg 1 := (1, ..., 1) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{1 \times K} \). In the particular case where all individuals are attributed the same cut-offs, then \( z = (z, ..., z) \), for some reference vector \( z \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^K \). In this case, if \( y_i < z \), then individual \( i \) can be said to be poor (the converse being false, in general).

We denote by \( N_p(y; z) \subset N \) the set of poor that results from a social state matrix \( y \) and a vector \( z \) of reference values. The number of poor people is \( n_p(y; z) := |N_p(y; z)| \). As we shall see, \( N_p(y; z) \) (hence \( n_p(y; z) \)) will be determined endogenously by the choice of a coherent multidimensional poverty index.

3.1 The utilitarian index

A poverty index is a mapping \( P : \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \to \mathbb{R}_+ \). We begin with three axioms that unambiguously characterize the “utilitarian” Poverty index.

The first one, anonymity, says that all agents and all dimensions are equally important:

**Anonymity.** Let \( x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \) and let \( \pi \in S_{KN} \) denote a permutation over its components \( \{1, ..., KN\} \). Then,

\[
P(s) = P(\pi(s))
\]

The second Axiom implies that \( P \) reduces to the identity mapping on the diagonal of \( \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \):

**Normalization.** Let \( s \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \) be such that \( s_i = a \ \forall i = \{1, ..., KN\} \). Then,

\[
P(s) = a
\]

The last property requires that the difference between the new and the initial values of \( P \) when subject \( i \)'s achievement relative to dimension \( j \) changes from \( s_{ij} \) to \( t_{ij} \), be a monotone function of the difference between \( s_{ij} \) and \( t_{ij} \).

\[^{7}\text{Given two vectors } x, y, x \ll y \text{ if the strict inequality holds coordinate-wise.}\]
Difference Monotonicity

Let $s, t \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}_+$ be such that $\exists i \neq j$ for which $s_{hq} = t_{hq}$ $\forall (h, q) \neq (i, j)$ for some increasing function $g_{ij} : \mathbb{R}_+ \to \mathbb{R}$. Since $g_{ij}(0) = 0$, it follows that $g_{ij}(x) \geq 0$ if, and only if, $x \geq 0$. Then,

$$P(s) - P(t) = g_{ij}(s_{ij} - t_{ij})$$

**Proposition 3.1** An index $P(\cdot)$ satisfies Anonymity, Normalization and Difference Monotonicity if, and only if, it takes the form

$$P(s) = \frac{1}{KN} \sum_{i \in N, j \in K} s_{ij}.$$ 

This index corresponds to the familiar arithmetic average, and we denote it $P_U$.

**Proof.** See subsection 6.1 of the Appendix. \hfill $\square$

### 3.2 The geometric average

The link between the (fairly classical) index, $P_U$, and the geometric average is given by the following transformation. Consider the following Poverty index, $G(\cdot)$, defined on $\mathbb{R}^{KN}_+$:

$$G(x) := \left[ \prod_{k, h} x_{k, h} \right]^{1/KN}. \quad (1)$$

Given a vector, $x \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}_+$, let us denote by $\ln x$ the vector whose coordinates are $\ln x_{k, h}$, every $h, k$. Obviously,

$$G(x) = \exp P_U(\ln x). \quad (2)$$

From this very simple remark, one deduces the axiomatization provided by Villar et al. (2010) that fully characterizes the geometric average as a Poverty index: Indeed, it follows from (2) that $G$ must verify the anonymity and normalization Axioms together with the following ratio monotonicity:
Ratio Monotonicity Let \( s, t \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \) be such that \( s_{hq} = t_{hq} \forall (h, q) \neq (i, j) \). Then,

\[
\frac{G(s)}{G(t)} = g_{ij} \left( \frac{s_{ij}}{t_{ij}} \right),
\]

for some increasing function \( g_{ij} : \mathbb{R}_{++} \to \mathbb{R} \). Since \( g_{ij}(1) = 1 \), it follows that \( g_{ij}(x) \geq 1 \) if, and only if, \( x \geq 1 \).

In other words, the geometric (or Cobb-Douglas) average may be viewed as the outcome of the Utilitarian rule after the transformation given by (2). The next section shows that \( G(\cdot) \) is but one extremal point of a whole family of Poverty indices that can be constructed in quite a similar way. The opposite extremal index of this family turns out to be the Maximin rule.

4 Coherent Poverty Indices

In order to define a coherent Poverty index, we need to impose some axioms on the mapping \( P(\cdot) \). For this purpose, we define a poverty exit set, \( \mathcal{E} \subset \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \). A population belongs to \( \mathcal{E} \) whenever it is not poor.

4.1 Axioms for \( \mathcal{E} \).

In order to build an ordinal index (i.e., an index that does not depend upon the choice of units in which dimensions are measured), we consider only normalized achievements. That is, if \( x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \) is a given social state, we shall deal with \( x := (x_{hk}/z_{hk})_{h,k} \). For the sake of clarity, achievements, \( x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \), are said to be non-normalized. Let also \( \mathbf{1} := (1, \ldots, 1) \) denote the unit vector in \( \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \).

Axiom 1. \( \mathbf{1} + \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \subset \mathcal{E} \).

Next, consider a population where all its individuals have non-normalized achievements that are all below the thresholds given by \( z \), and at least one subject has at least one
achievement strictly below the corresponding threshold. Again, such a population should be considered as poor. This is the content of the next Axiom.

Axiom 2. $E \cap (1 + \mathbb{R}^{KN}) = \{1\}$.

We now define a “box product” that will be handful for our purposes. For every $x, y \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}$, let $x \square y$ denote the vector in $\mathbb{R}^{KN}$ whose coordinates are $x_{k,h}z_{k,h}$. Consequently, $1/y$ denotes the (unique) vector such that $y \square 1/y = 1$, while $x \square \lambda$ is the vector with coordinates $x_{k,h}^\lambda$, for any $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$. For the sake of brevity, we sometimes write $x^\lambda$ — instead of $x \square \lambda$— whenever the meaning is clear from the context. The “box product” can be interpreted as formalizing a change in the achievements of the population under scrutiny. For instance, $x \square 1 = x$ stands for “no change”. By contrast, $x \square 0 = 0$ represents a radical depletion of the population, etc. For an arbitrary vector, $y \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}$, $x \square y$ will represent a change that may be dimension- and individual-dependent. Observe that $G(\cdot)$, defined by (1), is a group morphism from $(\mathbb{R}^{KN}_{++}, \square)$ to $(\mathbb{R}^{++}, \cdot)$, that is: $G(x \square y) = G(x)G(y)$. Moreover, $G(x^\lambda) = G^\lambda(x), \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}_{++}, \lambda \geq 0$.

A set $F \subset \mathbb{R}^{KN}_{++}$ is multiplicatively convex whenever, as soon as $x, y \in F$, then $x^\alpha \square y^{1-\alpha} \in F \forall \alpha \in [0,1]$. 

Axiom 3. The Poverty exit set, $E$, is multiplicatively convex.

Axiom 1 says that, if all the individuals of a population exhibit all their achievements weakly above the threshold (i.e., if $x \geq 1$), this population is not poor. Conversely, if $x \ll 1$, Axiom 2 implies that the population is poor. Ambiguity remains only whenever some individuals exhibit some achievements above the threshold, and others, not. Axiom 3 deals with such ambiguous cases. Suppose that a population, $x$, is not poor. Take $\lambda > 0$ and consider the auxiliary population given by $x^\lambda$. Axiom 4 says that this new population should not be considered as poor neither. Clearly, if $x \square 1/z \geq 1$ (resp. $x \square 1/z < 1$), then $(x^\lambda \square 1/z) \geq 1$ (resp. < 1), so that the auxiliary population turns out, indeed, not to be poor (resp. to be poor). What the next Axiom says is that this property should not hold only for the extreme cases envisaged by Axioms 1 and 2 but also for the “intermediary” cases.

A set $F \subset \mathbb{R}^{KN}_{++}$ is a multiplicative cone whenever, as soon as $x \in F$, then $x^\lambda \in F$ for any $\lambda \geq 0$.

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8 We could replace Axiom 2 by the weaker $E \cap (1 + \mathbb{R}^{KN}) = \emptyset$. But the remaining axioms would nevertheless strengthen it into Axiom 2 in most cases of interest for practical purposes.
**Axiom 4.** The Poverty exit set, $E$, is a multiplicative cone.

**Examples** The two following sets verify Axioms 1 to 4.

a) The "utilitarian case". Consider

$$E := \{ x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \mid G(x) \geq G(1) \},$$

$E$ is the upper-set of the hyperbola $\{ x : G(x) = 1 \}$, and is closed and (both additively and multiplicatively) convex.

b) The "Rawlsian case". Consider

$$E := \{ x \geq 1 \},$$

$E$ is closed and is both an affine (additively) convex cone and a multiplicative cone.

Although it is not necessary for the core of our theory, the next Axiom will prove handful.

**Axiom 5.** $E$ verifies the following Anonymity property: Let $x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN}$ and $\sigma(x) := (x_{\sigma(1)}, \ldots, x_{\sigma(N)}) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN}$ the vector obtained after having swapped its individuals with the permutation $\sigma \in S_N$. Then,

$$x \in E \iff \sigma(x) \in E \forall \sigma \in S_N.$$

4.2 Axioms for $P$.

Given a set $E$, the Poverty index, $P_E$, is defined as a measure of the minimal additional "achievements" that have to be added to a given distribution so that the population can be considered as non-poor, i.e., so that the resulting distribution belongs to $E$.

\[^9\text{i.e., in the usual sense borrowed from convex analysis.}\]
Obviously, $P_E$ will heavily depend upon the choice of $E$. And it is plain from the previous subsection that there are countless possible poverty exit sets. This is why
the axiomatic studied here only defines a family of poverty indices, each index being identified through its corresponding poverty exit set.

Given $E$, the mapping $P_E(\cdot)$ is defined as:

$$P_E(x) := \inf \{ \tau \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \square z^\tau \in E \}. \quad (3)$$

Axiom 1 implies $P_E(1) = 0$, and Axiom 2, $\lim_{x \to 0} P(x) = +\infty$. Conversely, given a poverty exit index, $P(\cdot)$, one defines the poverty exit set, $E_P$, as

$$E_P := \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}_{++} \mid P(x) \leq 0 \}. \quad (4)$$

We now state several properties for $P$. As we shall see, they can be deduced from Axioms 1-4 on $E$ via (3). Conversely, Axioms 1-4 can be deduced from the following properties of $P$, via (4).

**Axiom HI (Homothetic invariance)** \( \forall x \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}_{++}, \alpha \in \mathbb{R}, P(x \square z^\alpha) = P(x) - \alpha. \)

A consequence of Axiom HI is that $P(x \square z^{P(x)}) = 0$ — which is consistent with (3). It follows that

$$\forall x, x \square z^{P(x)} \in E. \quad (5)$$

**Axiom S (Submultiplicativity)** \( \forall x, y, P(x \square y) \leq P(x) + P(y). \)

Axiom S can be interpreted as follows: Since $x$ and $y$ are vectors of the same dimension, they correspond to populations of the same size. Averaging (in the multiplicative sense) two populations does not magnify the extent of poverty (i.e., the share of the poor within the global population), nor its intensity (i.e., the individual deprivation suffered from each individual) above the sum of the indices of the subpopulations. Hence, this axiom is a weak version of the subgroup additive decomposability applied to populations of equal size.
Axiom PH (Positive Homogeneity): \(\forall x \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN}, \forall \lambda \geq 0, P(x^\lambda) \leq \lambda P(x)\).

Axiom S implies that \(P(x^n) \leq nP(x)\) for every integer \(n\). Axiom PH extends this property to any nonnegative real number.

Axiom M (Monotonicity): \(P(x) \leq P(y) \forall y \leq x\).

Axiom NT (Non-triviality): \(P(x) > 0 \forall x < z\) (where the last inequality means that \(x \leq 0\) and \(x \neq 0\)).

By analogy from Artzner et al. (1999), a Poverty index that satisfies Axioms HI, S, PH, M and NT is said \textit{coherent}.

Quite similarly to the anonymity axiom for \(E\), the next one is not needed for the characterization of coherent poverty measures, but will prove useful.

Axiom A (Anonymity): Let \(x = (x_1, \ldots, x_n) \in \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN}\) and a permutation \(\sigma \in S_n\). Then, \(P(x) = P(\sigma(x))\).

**Proposition 4.1** (i) If a Poverty index, \(P(\cdot)\), is coherent, then its Poverty exit set, \(E_P\), defined by \(\mathbb{F}\) verifies Axioms 1-4 and is closed. Moreover, \(P(\cdot) = P_{E_P}(\cdot)\).

(ii) Conversely, if a set \(\mathbb{F}\) satisfies Axioms 1-4, then \(P_\mathbb{F}\) is coherent, and

\[ E_{P_\mathbb{F}} = \overline{\mathbb{F}}^{10} \]

(iii) \(E\) verifies the Anonymity axiom if, and only if, \(P(\cdot)\) does.

**Proof.** See subsection 6.2 in the Appendix.

\(\square\)

\(^{10}\) \(\mathbb{F}\) is the topological closure of \(\mathbb{F}\).
5 Properties of coherent multidimensional poverty measures

5.1 A representation theorem and ordinality

We now provide a full characterization of the whole family of coherent Poverty exit indices. For this purpose, let us define a weighted geometric average. Given any vector in the unit simplex, \( \pi \in \Delta^K_N := \{ p \in \mathbb{R}^K_N \mid \sum_{k,h} p_{k,h} = 1 \} \), the \( \pi \)-geometric average, \( G^\pi(\cdot) \), is defined by:

\[
G^\pi(x) := \prod_{k,h} x_{\pi_{k,h}}^{\pi_{k,h}}.
\]

**Proposition 5.1** The index \( P \) is coherent if, and only if, there exists a family, \( P \subset \Delta^K_N \), of weight vectors, such that

\[
P(x) = -\inf \left\{ \frac{\ln(G^\pi(x))}{\ln(G^\pi(z))} \mid \pi \in P \right\}.
\]

**Proof.**

The “if” part is immediate. The “only if” part can be deduced from Proposition 2.1 in Huber and Ronchetti (2009), and can be stated as a consequence of the bipolar theorem in linear duality theory. Consider the set

\[
C := \{ x \in \mathbb{R}^{KN} \mid x_{hk} = \ln(y_{hk}) \text{ for some } y \in \mathcal{E} \}.
\]

It follows from Axiom 3 and 4 together with the closedness of \( \mathcal{E} \) that \( C \) is a convex and closed cone in \( \mathbb{R}^{KN} \). Thus, its a polar cone.

\[
C^\circ := \{ \alpha \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}_+ \mid \sum_{hk} \alpha_{hk} x_{hk} \geq 0 \forall x \in C \}.
\]
is also a convex and closed cone in $\mathbb{R}_+^{KN}$. The bipolar theorem implies that

$$C = \{ x \in \mathbb{R}_+^{KN} \mid \sum_{h,k} \pi_{hk} x_{hk} \geq 0 \ \forall \pi \in \mathcal{P} \},$$

where $\mathcal{P} := \Delta_+^{KN} \cap \mathcal{C}^\circ$. We deduce from (5) that $\ln x + P(x) \ln z \in C$, for every $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^{KN}$. Thus, $\forall \pi \in \mathcal{P}$,

$$\sum_{h,k} \pi_{hk} (\ln x_{hk} + P(x) \ln z_{hk}) \geq 0.$$  

Therefore,

$$P(x) \sum_{h,k} \pi_{h,k} \ln z_{hk} \geq - \sum_{h,k} \pi_{hk} \ln x_{hk} \ \forall \pi \in \mathcal{P}.$$ 

Hence,

$$P(x) \geq \sup_{\pi} - \frac{\ln \left( \prod_{hk} x_{hk}^{\pi_{hk}} \right)}{\ln \left( \prod_{hk} z_{hk}^{\pi_{hk}} \right)} = - \inf \left\{ \frac{\ln(G^\pi(x))}{\ln(G^\pi(z))} \mid \pi \in \mathcal{P} \right\}.$$ 

Conversely, we deduce from Axiom 2 that $\ln x + P(x) \ln z + \ln \varepsilon \notin C$ for every $x \in \mathbb{R}_+^{KN}$ and every $0 < \varepsilon < 1$. Therefore, $\forall \pi \in \mathcal{P}$,

$$\sum_{h,k} \pi_{hk} (\ln x_{hk} + P(x) \ln z_{hk} + \ln \varepsilon) < 0.$$  

It follows that

$$P(x \Box \varepsilon) < - \inf \left\{ \frac{\ln(G^\pi(x))}{\ln(G^\pi(z))} \mid \pi \in \mathcal{P} \right\}.$$ 

The equality follows by continuity of $P(\cdot)$.

\[\square\]

**Examples**

a) The “utilitarian case” corresponds to uniform weights: $\mathcal{P} = \{(1/KN, ..., 1/KN)\}$.

b) The “Rawlsian” case corresponds to $\mathcal{P} = \Delta_+^{KN}$.

The next figure provides an illustration of the typical geometry of $\mathcal{E}$. 
Fig 1. A piecewise smooth poverty exit set

Observe that, in general, the frontier of the set $\mathcal{E}$ need not be smooth, as there is typically a kink at 1. The "utilitarian" case corresponds to the situation where the two branches of hyperbola coincide with the hypercurve: $\prod_{h,k} x_{h,k} = 1$. It is the unique case where the boundary of $\mathcal{E}$ is a smooth submanifold. The larger the set $\mathcal{P}$, the smaller the subset $\mathcal{E}$. Finally, the Rawlsian case corresponds with the situation where $\mathcal{E}$ coincides with the affine nonnegative orthant.

$$\mathcal{E} = 1 + \mathbb{R}_{+}^{KN}.$$ 

Notice that weights in $\mathcal{P}$ can differ both across individuals and dimensions. When $P$ (or, equivalently, $\mathcal{E}$) verifies Anonymity, the set of weights, $\mathcal{P}$, reduces to weights over dimensions. The weighted geometric average now becomes:

$$G^{\hat{\pi}}(x) := \prod_{k,h} x_{kh}^{\frac{\hat{\pi}_k}{N_{kh}}} \quad \forall \hat{\pi} \in \hat{\mathcal{P}} \subset \Delta_{+}^{K}.$$ 

**Corollary 5.1** The index $P$ is coherent and anonymous if, and only if, there exists a family, $\hat{\mathcal{P}} \subset \Delta_{+}^{K}$, of weights over dimensions such that

$$P(x) = -\inf\left\{ \frac{\ln(G^{\pi}(x))}{\ln(G^{\pi}(z))} \mid \pi \in \mathcal{P} \right\}. $$
Thanks to Theorem 5.1, whether it is anonymous or not, a coherent index $P$ can also easily be shown to be *ordinal* in the following sense.

*Ordinality.* A measure, $Q$, is said to be ordinal if the following holds. Given some $N \times K$-matrix $\Lambda = (\lambda_{ij}) \in \mathcal{M}_{N \times K} (\mathbb{R}^{++})$, given also a social status matrix $y \in \mathcal{M}_{N \times K} (\mathbb{R}^{++})$, and a cut-off vector, $z \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}$, there exists some $\lambda \in \mathbb{R}$ which depends only upon $\Lambda$, such that:

$$Q(y; z) + \lambda = Q(y \Box \Lambda; z \star \Lambda),$$

where $y \Box \Lambda$ is the $N \times K$-matrix with entry $(y \Box \Lambda)_{ij} := y_{ij} \Lambda_{ij}$, and $z \star \Lambda$ is the $NK$-vector with entry $(z \star \Lambda)_{nk} := z_{nk} \Lambda_{nk}$.

An example will easily illustrate how this abstract property solves several problems related to ordinal data. Consider the question: “Which kind of toilet facility does your household have?”, together with three possible answers:

a. “Open defecation field”

b. “Shared flush”

c. “Private flush”

Of course, the metric between each one of these answers does not have any sensible meaning. To circumvent this issue, it suffices to capture this question through two dimensions, each of them accepting two answers, $\{a, b\}$ and $\{a, c\}$, each captured by two variables $\{\alpha, \beta\} \subset \mathbb{R}$ and $\{\alpha, \gamma\} \subset \mathbb{R}$ respectively, with $\alpha < \beta < \gamma$. Ordinality then ensures that the choice of $(\alpha, \beta, \gamma)$ does not matter.

Going back to coherent poverty measures, it is straightforward that, for any $x \in \mathbb{R}^{KN}$ and any $\Lambda$ as above, $x \Lambda / z \Lambda = x / z$. Thus, as we only deal with normalized achievements, any Multidimensional Poverty Index is ordinal.
5.2 Who is poor?

In this subsection, we confine ourselves to the subfamily of anonymous coherent Poverty indices. Consequently, \( P \) is associated with a set, \( P \subset \Delta_+^K \), of \( K \)-dimensional vector of weights, \( \pi = (\pi_k)_k \), one for each dimension, belonging to the unit simplex.

We are now in a position to provide an answer to the question: “who is poor”? Regarding this issue, two kinds of approach have been explored in the literature.\(^{11}\) The “union” approach regards a person who is deprived in one dimension as being poor at the multidimensional level. This is usually acknowledged to be overly inclusive and lead to exaggerate estimates of poverty. By contrast, the “intersection” approach requires a person to be deprived in all dimensions before getting considered as poor. This is often considered too restricting, and may lead to untenable low estimates of poverty. We now show that the natural definition of a poor person that follows from the “coherent” approach leads to an endogenous determination that is always strictly less inclusive than the “union” approach and weakly more inclusive than the “intersection” approach. Therefore it lies somewhere between these two extremes, and in fact, it turns out that only the Rawlsian case coincides with the “intersection” viewpoint.

Two examples will help identify how the determination of poor persons occurs in the present setting. Consider the case where \( N = 1 \), i.e., the population consists of a single person. Then, clearly, this single person, \( i \), will be poor whenever the population is so, i.e., when \( P(x_i) < 0 \). Next, suppose that the population is made of \( n \) identical people. Again, each person will be poor if the population is so, i.e., if, and only if,

\[
\prod_k x_i^{\pi_k} < \prod_k z_i^{\pi_k} \quad \forall \pi \in P
\]

It is this latter condition that we adopt as a definition. Indeed, a simple continuity argument explains why no other choice can be made: Take \( 0 < \varepsilon < 1 \); one has \( x \square \varepsilon \) poor and \( G^\pi(x) < 1 \) for any \( \pi \). However, \( \lim_{\varepsilon \to 1} G^\pi(x) = 1^- \). Thus, no population such that \( G^\pi(x) < 1 \) can be considered as non-poor.

**Definition 5.1** Given a coherent Poverty index, \( P \), associated with a set \( P \subset \Delta_+^{KN} \) of weights, a person, \( i \), is poor whenever

\[
\prod_k x_i^{\pi_k} < \prod_k z_i^{\pi_k} \quad \forall \pi \in P
\]

\(^{11}\) See, e.g., Alkire and Foster (2011a) and Villar et al. (2010).

\(^{12}\) Notice that, here, \( x \) is not normalized.
or, equivalently, when
\[
\sup_{\pi \in \mathcal{P}} G^\pi(x_i) < 1.
\]

In the “utilitarian” case (where \( \mathcal{P} \) reduces to the uniform singleton), this definition coincides with the one introduced by [Villar et al. (2010)].

As an illustration, consider a society with two dimensions. The poor are all the individuals whose characteristics are located strictly below the two branches of hyperbola:

![Diagram](Fig 2. Who is poor?)

The set \( \mathcal{E} \) is always larger than the one defined by the intersection approach, and is always contained in the one provided by the union approach. The Rawlsian case, here, coincides with the intersection approach.

### 5.3 Other properties

Here are the properties verified by coherent Poverty indices. When they are evident, proofs are left to the reader.

1. **Multiplicative decomposability**: Suppose that \( x_1 \) (resp. \( x_2 \)) is a population of size \( n_1 \) (resp. \( n_2 \)). Let us denote by \( \langle x_1, x_2 \rangle \) the population of size \( n = n_1 + n_2 \), obtained by merging the first two. One has:
\[
G_\pi((x_1, x_2)) = \left[ G_\pi(x_1) \right]^{n_1} \left[ G_\pi(x_2) \right]^{n_2} \forall \pi \in \mathcal{P},
\]

so that

\[
P(x_1, x_2) = P(x_1^{n_1} \square x_2^{n_2}).
\]

2. The next property is a special case of multiplicative decomposability:

**Replication invariance**: For any population, \( x \),

\[
P(x, x) = P(x).
\]

3. **Symmetry**: If \( x \) is obtained from \( y \) by a permutation, then \( P(x) = P(y) \).

4. **Path independence**: One can aggregate individual unidimensional values first across dimensions and then across agents, or vice versa, obtaining the same result.

5. In order to check the various monotonicity properties of coherent measures, let us recall that \( x \) is said to be obtained from \( y \) by

4. The next property asks that a reduction of size \( \delta > 0 \) in the deprivation with respect to dimension \( k \) of a poor person \( i \) who is worse off in this dimension than another poor person, \( j \), more than compensates an increase of the same size, \( \delta \), in the deprivation of \( j \), provided their relative positions remain unaltered. Formally, if \( x_{jk} - x_{ik} \geq 2\delta \), \( y_{ik} = x_{ik} + \delta \) and \( y_{jk} = x_{jk} - \delta \), while \( y_{hl} = x_{hl} \forall (h, l) \notin \{(i, k), (j, k)\} \).

**Transfer principle**. \( P(y) \leq P(x) \).

Indeed,

\[
x_{ik}x_{jk} < (x_{ik} + \delta)(x_{jk} - \delta) = y_{ik}y_{jk}.
\]

It follows that \( [x_{ik}x_{jk}]^{\alpha_k} \leq [y_{ik}y_{jk}]^{\alpha_k} \), for every \( \alpha_k \geq 0 \). The conclusion follows.
Also observe that the geometric mean is a distribution sensitive measure that penalizes the dispersion of the individual values, relative to the arithmetic mean. In particular, for two distributions with identical mean values it assigns higher value of the intensity of the poverty to that in which the distribution of the $y_{ij}$ values is more disperse.

5. The reduction in the deprivation of dimension $k$ required to compensate an increase in the deprivation of dimension $\ell$ is smaller the smaller the initial level of achievement in $\ell$. This feature simply follows from the decreasing marginal rate of substitution of the individual poverty index across achievement dimensions. Obviously, this property cannot be satisfied by any (weighted) arithmetic measure (Alkire and Foster (2011b)).

6. The Poverty focus requirement says that only changes within the population, $N_p(y; z)$, of poor affect $P$. This property is not fulfilled, in general, by coherent indices as these capture some kind of substitutability among poor and non-poor. However, as long as the cut-off, $z$, is exogenous, one easy way to recover Poverty focus consists in censoring achievements as follows, before normalizing them:

$$\tilde{x}_{ik} := \begin{cases} x_{ik} & \text{if } x_{ik} < z_{ik} \\ z_{ik} & \text{if } x_{ik} \geq z_{ik} \end{cases}$$

7. The same censoring provides us with the Deprivation focus property, namely: only changes in dimensions where poor people are deprived affect $P$.

8. Following Kolm (1977) and Alkire and Foster (2011a), we can check how much a coherent poverty index, $P$, is sensitive to inequality in the distribution of achievements and deprivations. There are several ways to do this. One way consists in considering mean-preserving spreads, i.e., transformations of a given population that increase the spreads of the achievements with respect to their arithmetic mean without affecting the mean itself. (Such transformations are the reversal of the change considered above for the Transfer principle.) An inequality-sensitive Index should be decreasing with respect to such transformations. Formally, an increase of size $\delta > 0$ in the deprivation with respect to dimension $k$ of $i$ should not compensate an decrease of the same size, $\delta$, in the deprivation of $j$. Formally, if $x_{jk} - x_{ik} \geq 0$, $y_{ik} = x_{ik} - \delta$ and $y_{jk} = x_{jk} + \delta$, while $y_{hl} = x_{hl}$ $\forall (h, l) \notin \{(i, k), (j, k)\}$, then, by the same argument as for the Transfer principle, we get:

13This is standard practice, see Alkire and Foster (2011a).
Mean-preserving spread sensitivity $P(x) < P(y)$.

9. Following Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) and Alkire and Foster (2011a), we say that $x$ is obtained from $y$ by a simple rearrangement among the poor if the achievements of two poor persons, $i$ and $j$, have been reallocated so that, for each dimension $k$:

$$(x_{ik}, x_{jk}) = (y_{jk}, y_{ik}) \quad \text{or} \quad (x_{ik}, x_{jk}) = (y_{ik}, y_{jk}),$$

while the achievements of anyone else remain untouched. If, in addition, $y_i$ and $y_j$ are comparable but $x_i$ and $x_j$ are not, then $x$ is said to be obtained from $y$ by an association decreasing rearrangement among the poor. Reducing inequality this way does trivially decrease any coherent multidimensional Poverty Index:

$$P(y) \leq P(x).$$

This property is called Weak Arrangement.

10. Another way to test the sensitivity towards inequality of an Index consists in averaging the achievement vectors, $y_i$ and $y_j$ of two poor persons, $i$ and $j$ in such a way that $i$ now exhibits $x_i := (1 - \lambda)y_i + \lambda y_j$ (with $\lambda \in (0, 1)$) and $x_j := \lambda y_i + (1 - \lambda)y_j$. The new population $(x_i, x_j)$ is viewed as being unambiguously less unequal than the original one, $(y_i, y_j)$, which should result in a lower or equal value of the multidimensional poverty index. Here, we translate linear convex combinations in geometric combinations, so as to arrive at the following definition. We say that $x \in \mathcal{M}_{n \times k}(\mathbb{R}^+) \setminus \mathcal{N}_{n \times k}(\mathbb{R}^+)$ is obtained from $y \in \mathcal{M}_{n \times k}(\mathbb{R}^+)$ by a geometric averaging of achievements among the poor if, for every poor $i$, there exist weights $(\alpha_j)_{j \in \mathcal{N}_p(y; x)} \in \Delta^+_{N_p(y; x)}$ such that

$$x_i = \prod_{j \in \mathcal{N}_p(y; x)} y_j^{\alpha_j},$$

while non poor persons are not affected (i.e., $x_i = y_i$ for $i \notin \mathcal{N}_p(y; z)$).

Multiplicative weak transfer. If $x$ is obtained from $y$ by a geometric averaging of achievements among the poor, then one should have $P(x) \leq P(y)$. 
However, this property is not satisfied by a coherent measure, in general. Consider, for example, a population, \((a, b)\), consisting in 2 persons and a single dimension (with \(a < b < 1\)). The population \((a^{1/3}b^{2/3}, b)\) is obtained from \((a, b)\) by a geometric averaging of achievements among the poor, but:

\[
G(a^{1/3}b^{2/3}, b) > G(a, b).
\]

References


6 Appendix

6.1 Proof of Prop. 3.1

\begin{proof}

Let \( s \in \mathbb{R}_+^{KN} \). By difference monotonicity and normalization,

\[ P(s_{11}, 0, ..., 0) - P(0, ..., 0) = g_{11}(s_{11}) \]
\[ P(s_{11}, s_{12}, ..., 0) - P(s_{11}, 0, ..., 0) = g_{12}(s_{12}) \]

so that

\end{proof}
\[ P(s) = P(0) + \sum_{i,j} g_{ij}(s_{ij}). \]

By anonymity, \( g_{ij}(\cdot) = g(\cdot) \) \( \forall i,j \). The Normalization axiom yields: \( P(0,...,0) = 0 \). Moreover,

\[ P(a,...,a) = KNg(a) = a. \]

Therefore, \( g(a) = \frac{a}{KN} \). The conclusion follows.

\[ \square \]

6.2 Proof of Prop. 4.1

Proof.

(i) 1) \( P_E(1) = 0 \) and Monotonicity imply that \( \mathcal{E} \) verifies Axiom 1.

2) If \( x \ll 1 \), Monotonicity implies \( P_E(x) \geq 0 \). However, we can find \( \alpha > 0 \) such that \( x \square z^\alpha \ll 0 \), so that \( P_E(x \square z^\alpha) \geq 0 \). HI then implies that \( \alpha \leq 0 \). Contradiction. Thus, \( \mathcal{E}_P \) verifies Axiom 2.

3) Axioms S and PH imply that \( \mathcal{E}_P \) is multiplicatively convex.

4) If \( x \in \mathcal{E}_P \), one has: \( P(x^\lambda) \leq \lambda P(x) \leq 0 \) for all \( \lambda \geq 1 \). Consequently, \( \mathcal{E}_P \) is a multiplicative cone.

5) Axioms PH and S imply that the function \( x \ni \mathbb{R}_{++}^{KN} \rightarrow P(\exp(x)) \) is convex, hence continuous. Consequently, \( x \mapsto P(x) \) itself must be continuous, so that \( \mathcal{E}_P \) is closed.

(ii) 0) Axioms 2 and 3 ensure that \( P_E \) is well-defined.

1) \( \inf\{ \tau \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \square z^\tau \square \alpha \in \mathcal{E} \} = \inf\{ \tau \in \mathbb{R} \mid x \square z^\tau \in \mathcal{E} \} - \alpha \), which proves HI.
2) Suppose that $x □ z^\lambda$ and $y □ z^\beta$ both belong to $\mathcal{E}$. Axiom 3 implies that $(x □ z^\lambda)^{1/\alpha}$ and $(y □ z^\beta)^{1/\beta}$ also belong to $\mathcal{E}$ for every $\alpha \in [0,1)$. Axiom 2 then implies that $(x □ y) □ z^{\alpha+\beta} = (x □ z^\lambda) □ (y □ z^\beta) \in \mathcal{E}$. This proves the multiplicative convexity.

3) Suppose $x \leq y$ and $x □ z^\lambda \in \mathcal{E}$. Then, $y □ z^\lambda \geq x □ z^\lambda$, so that, by Axiom 1, $y □ z^\lambda \in \mathcal{E}$. The monotonicity of $P$ follows.

4) If $m \geq P_\mathcal{E}(x)$, then, $x □ z^m \in \mathcal{E}$, hence, $\forall \lambda > 0$, $x^{\lambda □ z^\lambda} = (x □ z^m)^{\lambda} \in \mathcal{E}$.

Therefore, $P_\mathcal{E}(x^\lambda) \leq \lambda m$.

5) $\forall x \in \mathcal{F}$, $P(x) \leq 0$. Thus, $\mathcal{F} \subset \mathcal{E}_P$.